Moral hazard : does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? /

"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors...

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Main Author: Lane, Timothy D. 1955- (Author)
Corporate Author: International Monetary Fund. External Relations Department.
Other Authors: Phillips, Steven, 1961- (Author)
Format: Book Electronic
Published:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Series:Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ; 28.
Online Access:EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection. Access for Greenville College users.
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Online Access:EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection. Access for Greenville College users.